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Foreword 
 
In April 2001 the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) invited the Vietnamese 
Prime Minister’s Research Commission (PMRC) to work jointly on a study on the topic of 
inter-ministerial coordination during WTO accession. The background of this offer was the 
shared view of the need to improve national trade-related governance capacities. A few weeks 
later, a group consisting of two PMRC specialists and one representative of the Vietnam 
Institute for Trade (VIT), together with four other experts from the Prime Minister’s Group on 
External Economic Relations (GEER), conducted a one-week study trip to Geneva. The result 
of this joint effort was a comprehensive study on the issue of “Inter-ministerial Coordination 
during WTO Accession,” including practical recommendations on how to improve the Viet-
namese system of trade-related coordination. 
Since the empirical and less sensitive part of the original report might be useful for a broader 
audience - in particular for gaining a better understanding of the institutional challenges de-
veloping and transition countries face during the current round of global trade talks -, INEF is 
now publishing, with the permission of GTZ, a substantially revised and updated version of 
the previous study1.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The earlier study, “Inter-ministerial Coordination During WTO Accession. Experiences of Selected (Transi-
tion) Economies and some Considerations for Vietnam,” was written by Bui Xuan Nhat, Tran Ngoc Anh, and 
the author of this report.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The general need for effec-
tive inter-ministerial coor-
dination  
For developing countries and economies 
in transition, accession to and member-
ship in the global trade body is a delicate 
and cumbersome experience. The need 
to bring national legislation into confor-
mity with WTO rules, negotiating and 
implementing concessions on market 
access for trade in goods and services, 
transparency requirements, emerging 
new trade issues (e. g. environmental 
standards), and the necessity to establish 
and maintain professional trade-related 
research competence places heavy bur-
dens on applicants and developing mem-
bers that not infrequently exceed their 
institutional capacity for formulating 
policy options or negotiation strategies.  
National preparation for and participa-
tion in the WTO system is subject to two 
sets of constraints, which must be taken 
into account at the outset when man-
agement and coordination mechanisms 
are designed or upgraded. Externally, the 
WTO application (and later member-
THE WTO ACCESSION PROCESS  
Any state or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may join the WTO,
but WTO members must agree on the terms. Therefore, accession to the WTO is essentially a process of
negotiation —quite different from the process of accession to other international entities. Broadly speak-
ing, accession goes through four stages:  
Fact-finding / Information-gathering: The government applying for membership has to describe all
aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements. This is submitted to
the WTO in a Memorandum which is examined by the Working Party dealing with the country’s applica-
tion. At the initial meeting of the Working Party, members examine previously submitted questions and
answers to study the conformity of the Applicant's trade regime with the various requirements of the WTO
Agreements. In subsequent Working Party Meetings, additional questions in writing, responses, and
further information papers are exchanged.  
Negotiation Phase: When the Working Party has made sufficient progress on principles and policies,
parallel bilateral talks begin between the prospective new member and individual countries. They are
bilateral because different countries have different trading interests. These talks cover tariff rates, specific
market access commitments, and other policies in goods and services. The new member’s commitments
must apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are
negotiated bilaterally. In other words, the talks determine the benefits other WTO members can expect
when the new member joins.  
Protocol of Accession: The summary of the discussions in the Working Party is contained in a Report of
the Working Party. In addition, Schedules of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and of Specific
Commitments on Services are prepared. These three documents are annexed to the so-called Protocol of
Accession, which encloses the terms of accession agreed by the Applicant and members of the Working
Party.  
Membership: All documents elaborated by the Working Party are presented to the WTO General Council
or the Ministerial Conference. If a two-thirds majority of WTO members vote in favour, the applicant is
free to sign the protocol and to accede to the organization.  
Compiled from WTO’s Training Package and the WTO Guide Trading into the Future. For a comprehen-
sive description of the accession process, see WTO: Technical Note on the Accession Process, Geneva 
1999, WTO Document WT/ACC/7/Rev.1. 
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ship) generates a common set of re-
quirements which all countries must 
respond to in a more or less standardized 
way. Internally, each country must 
develop an intra-governmental system of 
trade policy preparation and coordina-
tion adapted to its own circumstances 
and needs, including the allocation of 
governmental power and authority. 
Often underestimated, the intensity and 
focus of trade-related coordination proc-
esses during the phase of accession and 
the later stage of full membership differ 
somewhat:  
1. Negotiating WTO membership 
appears to create what may be 
termed a "peak load" problem. The 
political priority of securing mem-
bership, and the difficulties of 
coming to terms with a huge mass 
of new policies and legislation re-
quire the creation of a team dedi-
cated to this task. One aspect that 
is essential during this phase is 
perceptible and continuous support 
from the center of the govern-
ment2. Short-term pressures foster 
the illusion that after accession is 
achieved, things will become eas-
ier and the peak of demands on 
government administration will be 
over. But things will never go back 
                                                 
2 In this report, the term “center of govern-
ment” means the top national echelons of a 
country’s system of political decision-
making; it thus comprises more than only the 
Prime Minister, the Chancellor or the Presi-
dent. Other eminent forces, such as the na-
tional leader’s immediate “auxiliary ma-
chine” (i.e. Government Office, Chancellor’s 
Office, or - in some transition economies - 
the still functioning Secretariat of the Central 
Committee) are explicitly included in this 
term. 
to "normal," Experience suggests 
the opposite is true. Membership 
creates a different situation, but 
not an easier one.  
2. After accession, the obligations of 
membership have to be met during 
the negotiated transition period. 
This requires considerable invest-
ment in capacities for policy im-
plementation in line with the ac-
cession protocol and WTO provi-
sions. The built-in review of some 
WTO agreements obliges mem-
bers, in addition, to keep track of 
the progress of intra-organizational 
discussions. The country’s Perma-
nent Mission to Geneva is the na-
tional “watchdog” and should at-
tentively monitor the dynamics of 
daily WTO work. In addition, new 
issues are continually being placed 
on the WTO agenda. The Doha 
Ministerial Meeting provided a 
mandate, for example, to clarify 
the relationship between the multi-
lateral trade and environment re-
gimes as well as to negotiate on 
the liberalization of trade in envi-
ronmental goods and services. The 
implications of conceivable liber-
alization have to be considered and 
assessed by all domestic stake-
holders in order to establish na-
tional bargaining positions that re-
flect what is desirable and feasible. 
A well-managed mechanism of 
trade-related information and co-
ordination in the capital helps to 
absorb and digest information 
from the mission and ensures that 
national stakeholders' interests and 
participation in the global trade 
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negotiations are given appropriate 
consideration.   
It is worth noting that the result of acces-
sion (as well as of later liberalization 
talks) depends on the general system of 
domestic policy coordination. Since 
WTO membership is a severe test of 
governmental capacities (and thus can be 
considered a touchstone for the country’s 
capacity to meet and manage global 
challenges), it calls for a re-thinking and 
re-designing of the internal preparation 
and coordination process within national 
governments. If there are weaknesses or 
shortcomings in the domestic system, it 
is very likely that they will be come to 
the fore in negotiations with WTO 
members - perhaps at considerable 
economic and political cost. Conversely, 
deliberate efforts to improve and up-
grade national policy coordination ca-
pacities with a view to more effective 
management of external relations is 
likely to have the added benefit of sup-
porting the strengthening of domestic 
policy coordination capacities.  
1.2. Objective of the study and 
selection of country exam-
ples 
The focus of the original study was the 
support of the Vietnamese government’s 
own consideration of adjusting and 
improving the inter-ministerial coordina-
tion process for an effective integration 
in the WTO as well as other relevant 
international and regional trade-related 
organizations. Because of its direct 
practical relevance and its wider implica-
tions for accession processes in general, 
this paper concentrates on how the gov-
ernments of some selected WTO mem-
ber countries have sought to assert their 
national trade interests in the process of 
accession. The background information 
provided on experiences of recent WTO 
members with inter-ministerial coordina-
tion is intended to make it possible for 
other applicants to draw conclusions for 
their own accession process beyond the 
preliminary observations and recom-
mendations of this study.    
The joint mission to Geneva engaged in 
comprehensive research at WTO, 
UNCTAD, as well as several country 
missions and conducted interviews with 
some prominent resource persons. The 
focus of this research was in the follow-
ing key areas: 
• Difficulties encountered by selected 
countries in organizing inter-
ministerial coordination during ac-
cession to the global trade body, 
• Functions and authority of inter-
ministerial coordination (IMC) units 
in selected WTO member countries,  
• Interplay of the IMC unit with the 
“nodal point” of the government, line 
ministries and the country’s Perma-
nent Mission to Geneva,  
• The endowment of actors with hu-
man resources and technical infra-
structure (in particular the IMC unit), 
• Daily operation of the coordinating 
unit and ways to strengthen coopera-
tion among national stakeholders. 
Methodologically, the present study 
draws on the ideas and perceptions of the 
New Institutional Economics, discussing 
the “performance” of different ap-
proaches to domestic coordination dur-
ing international trade negotiations. It 
aims to identify various outcomes of 
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different institutional set-ups, whose 
common goal is to maximize the internal 
gains resulting from cooperation.  
The material presented below is mainly 
empirical, though it also contains some 
analytical elements. Empirically, the 
focus is on how some recently joined 
member states prepared their national 
policy positions for negotiations at the 
WTO level. Consideration is given to the 
different contexts and requirements of 
accession negotiations. Analytically, the 
report provides some ideas of how na-
tional governmental capacities for WTO 
accession and active membership can be 
assessed in a more systematic and stan-
dardized way.  
The country missions interviewed in 
Geneva neither represent an accurate 
cross-section of WTO members nor is 
the selection based on a deliberate politi-
cal agenda. Basically, the aim was to 
attempt to gain a broad view of experi-
ences made with inter-ministerial coor-
dination during accession by discussing 
relevant issues with recently joined 
WTO members, preferably transition 
economies. Since this expertise is easily 
accessible at WTO headquarters in 
Geneva, no plans were made to seek 
additional information in the capitals of 
WTO member countries, mainly because 
of time constraints and cost-benefit 
considerations. 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
New Institutional Economics is a tree with many branches and twigs. The terminology “institu-
tional economics” covers a wide range of schools of thought and methods. It includes several
varieties of transaction costs economics, from Coase to North and Williamson, as well as various
branches of organisation theory, including property rights and incomplete contracts theory, and
its analysis of organisational design. 
All these schools of institutional economic thought have a common characteristic: they examine
how informational problems affect organisational performance, though from different angles.
Transaction cost economics looks at the cost of obtaining information required to conclude a
contract or exchange and the potential costs of postcontractual uncertainty or absence of infor-
mation. Property rights theory examines how different allocations of this residual contractual
uncertainty create different incentive structures. Modern organisation theory combines these
different techniques to study incentives and delegation of tasks in large organisations or hierar-
chies. Institutions – rules of behaviour – exist precisely because they are means to partially
overcome these informational problems and the resulting uncertainties. Bilateral contracts,
general laws and informal agreements ensure that some of these are kept within acceptable
limits. 
For an introduction, see Furubotn, Eirik G. and Richter, Rudolf: Institutions and Economic Theory: The
Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, Ann Arbor 1997. 
The countries studied include those with 
strong and highly effective coordination 
mechanisms as well as some in which 
the instruction of the center of govern-
ment to join the global trade body as 
quickly as possible became first priority. 
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2. Managing National  
Policy Coordination:  
Experiences of some  
Selected (Transition) 
Economies 
The foreign missions that have contrib-
uted to this report3 are (in chronological 
order of visit): 
• Permanent Mission of Vietnam, 
2.1. Institutional Variables • Permanent Mission of Germany, 
Depending on constitutional parameters 
and the political priorities set, inter-
ministerial coordination during WTO 
accession and membership can be organ-
ized in various ways. Different frame-
work conditions offer different opportu-
nities to structure and guide the adminis-
trative process. It is evident that most 
transition economies failed to conduct a 
careful assessment of alternative institu-
tional options during the initial phase of 
accession. IMC is organized by “trial 
and error” and is best considered more a 
learning process on how to meet the 
demands and requirements of full WTO 
membership than a deliberate design of 
optimal institutions. Since the complexi-
ties of (approaching) WTO membership 
and the impact on domestic institutions 
are quite commonly underestimated, 
these empirical findings are not at all so 
surprising. 
• Permanent Mission of Bulgaria, 
• Permanent Mission of India, 
• Permanent Mission of Lithuania, 
• Permanent Mission of Kyrgyz Re-
public, 
• Permanent Mission of Moldova, 
• Permanent Mission of Croatia. 
The revised and updated report also 
contains information on Vietnam's 
preparations for accession. Since mem-
bership negotiations are not yet con-
cluded, the reader may be willing to 
excuse the in part patchy description of 
applicant coordination mechanisms.  
Additional discussions were conducted 
with representatives of UNCTAD and 
some selected resource persons (A. 
Dunkel, K. Kautzor-Schröder). They 
provided additional input on inter-
ministerial coordination experiences of 
other WTO members. Without their 
assistance and the highly appreciated 
support of the missions named, the 
findings of the study would have been 
less detailed and focused. 
In improving the performance or effi-
ciency4 of a given national trade-related 
                                                 
                                                 
3 The commitments of some recently acceded 
member countries are downloadable at the 
WTO under the document numbers 
WT/ACC/KGZ/26 (Kyrgyz Republic), 
WT/ACC/LTU/52 (Lithuania), 
WT/ACC/HRV/59 (Croatia), 
WT/ACC/MOL/37 (Moldova), 
WT/ACC/BGR/5 (Bulgaria). First informa-
tion on Vietnam’s trade regime can be found 
under WT/ACC/VNM/2. 
4 The term “efficiency” is somewhat problem-
atic within the NIE context. Since attempts to 
assess the efficiency of various organiza-
tional arrangements in the narrow (techno-
economic) sense can generate only absurd 
results (i.e. there are no common, incontest-
able criteria for the efficiency of organiza-
tions in an insecure, continuously changing 
world!), the distinctive feature of “efficient” 
vs. “inefficient” must be appraised more 
qualitatively. (see Furubotn, E. & Richter, R.: 
op. cit. p. 488ff. and p. 504f.). In general it 
may be said that a coordination structure is 
“efficient” if it offers incentives strong 
enough to induce continued and voluntary 
contributions of all relevant stakeholders.  
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coordination system, a first set of institu-
tional questions must be answered: 
• What administrative functions fall 
within the authority of which pro-
tagonists? How is the division of la-
bor organized?   
• What is the position of the adminis-
trative unit dealing with IMC issues 
within the governmental apparatus?  
• What is the IMC unit’s sphere of 
authority?  Where are the institu-
tional limits of its responsibility, and 
who determines them? 
• Are staff and other resources suffi-
cient to meet the coordination task? 
• How is the coordination work actu-
ally organized? (frequency of meet-
ings, reporting etc.)? 
The following case studies try to answer 
those questions. Since the information 
provided here on institutional aspects 
and internal problems of government 
actions also shed some light on delicate 
procedures and decisions of recently 
joined WTO members, the reader may 
                                                                   
For the purpose of this study, some more dis-
tinctive performance criteria are indispensa-
ble. They are (1) the internal dissemination of 
trade-related information (do relevant stake-
holders perceive themselves as sufficiently 
informed?), (2) the packaging for negotia-
tions (did the packaging process proceed 
smoothly, without any severe obstruction by 
relevant stakeholders?), (3) arbitration and 
conciliation (have domestic differences been 
arbitrated internally in a fair and transparent 
manner?), (4) cross-sector conformity (are 
there any serious violations of indisputable, 
non-negotiable WTO-provisions?), and (5) 
allocation of Technical Assistance (do rele-
vant stakeholders complain about the extent 
to which they have received support (re-
quested in advance) for WTO-preparations?). 
For a more detailed description of the pa-
rameters assessed, see Chapter 2.2 as well as 
Chapter 4.2 + 4.3. 
be prepared to excuse the – in some 
cases – somewhat fragmentary nature of 
the information provided.  
2.1.1. Protagonists and their status  
In Lithuania, a recent WTO member 
(May 2001), coordination work during 
accession was conducted by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). This unusual 
decision was the result of the recognition 
by the government that MoFA occupies 
„a somewhat higher position“ in the 
governmental apparatus than other line 
ministries. Since WTO-related capacity 
was very limited in the first phase of 
accession, a so-called “Economic De-
partment” was established to coordinate 
the accession process and help MoFA 
foster its „primus inter pares“ function.  
Technical aspects of accession were 
handled in close cooperation with key 
line ministries such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Economy, 
the Customs Department, the Patent 
Office and the Ministry of Culture. Since 
the IMC unit was located at MoFA, 
communication with and instructions to 
the Permanent Mission proceeded 
smoothly and without any significant 
problems. In particular, during the very 
intensive final stage of accession when 
the concern was to eliminate some re-
maining obstacles with a few bilateral 
trade negotiation partners, effective and 
timely communication was one vital 
prerequisite for asserting as many identi-
fied national bargaining positions as 
possible.  
Aside from the strong axis between 
MoFA and the Permanent Mission, 
parliament played a very distinctive role 
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codified in the accession protocol must 
be ratified by parliament before full 
WTO membership is achieved. More-
over, good internal communication with 
the legislative body was essential be-
cause MoFA was faced with a serious 
internal conflict with the Ministry of 
Agriculture about the negotiation strat-
egy concerning market access for agri-
cultural products. As a result, MoFA 
cooperated closely with the parliament’s 
“Committee on Agriculture.” Other 
committees of the national assembly 
were informed and likewise involved, 
which later turned out to be extremely 
useful for a rapid ratification of the 
accession protocol.  
„Foreign Economic Relations Depart-
ment“ within MoE. The representative to 
Geneva acknowledged that coordination 
was a tricky issue at the beginning of the 
accession process, but has improved 
considerable over time. Beside the spe-
cial WTO unit at the MoE, Croatia set up 
an “Inter-ministerial Working Group.” 
One senior official as well as one techni-
cal expert of relevant government enti-
ties participated in the regular meetings 
(including the Standardization Associa-
tion, the State Inspectorate, the Agency 
for Intellectual Property).  
A “Negotiation Team” under the author-
ity of the Inter-ministerial Working 
Group conducted the actual bargaining  Coordination Point Chief Negotiator 
Lithuania Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Economic 
Department) 
N.A.  
Croatia Ministry for Economics (Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations Dept.) plus “Inter-
ministerial Working Group” 
Status: Assistant to Minister of 
Economics, headed the Inter-
ministerial Working Group  
Moldova Ministry of Economy and Reform (MER), 
WTO Dept. 
Status: Vice Minister (MER) 
Bulgaria Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic 
Cooperation (MTFEC) plus “Inter-
ministerial Working Group” 
Status Vice Minister (MTFEC) 
Kyrgyz Rep. Commission on Negotiations with the 
WTO (CNWTO) 
Deputy Prime Minister (and at the 
same time Minister of Trade) 
Vietnam Ministry of Trade (MoT), National Com-
mittee for International Economic Coop-
eration (NCIEC), Government Office (GO) 
Vice Minister (MoT) 
India Ministry of Commerce  and Industry “Special Secretary WTO” In the case of Croatia, responsibility for 
inter-ministerial coordination fell under 
the authority of the Ministry for Eco-
nomics (MoE) or, to be more precise, the 
with WTO members. The Ministry of 
Economy and the Ministry of Agricul-
ture provided considerable assistance. 
The Chief Negotiator was assigned the 
(MoCI), Trade Policy Div. 
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position of an Assistant to the Minister 
of Economy.  
One important aspect, though perhaps 
less significant than in other accessions, 
was the role of the Permanent Mission to 
Geneva. Because of the Croatia's prox-
imity to WTO headquarters it served 
mainly as a contact and information 
point, and was thus staffed by only one 
WTO expert.  
In Moldova things were organized in a 
more or less similar way. The key insti-
tution was the Ministry of Economy and 
Reform, which also provided the Chief 
Negotiator (Vice minister level). The 
WTO Department contributed expertise 
and staff. One major difficulty for 
Moldova during accession was the re-
peated replacement (3 times) of the chief 
negotiator, which impacted significantly 
on the continuity and to some extent on 
the outcome of the negotiations. Since 
the Permanent Mission to Geneva is 
under authority of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, tensions were exacerbated 
when the Economics Ministry tried to 
give the mission instructions. At the 
same time, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was unable to develop sufficient 
WTO expertise to handle related issues 
on its own.  
To settle the dispute, an IMC body was 
established (“Inter-ministerial Commit-
tee on Accession to WTO”), which 
included, in addition to the standard line 
ministries, the national Intellectual 
Property Agency. A representative of the 
Chamber of Commerce attended the 
meetings too, albeit with no voting 
rights. 
The IMC unit approved the mandate of 
the Ministry of Economy as well as the 
interim results of the negotiations. It also 
gave instructions on implementing some 
of the expected WTO commitments. 
Formally, the IMC body was critical in 
reaching consensus on important deci-
sions, but the actual work was done by 
the WTO Division in the Ministry of 
Economy.  
The government of Bulgaria set up, 
under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Trade and Foreign Economic Coopera-
tion (MTFEC), an inter-ministerial 
working group that consisted of repre-
sentatives of all ministries involved in 
the formulation and implementation of 
trade policies. The Deputy Minister of 
Trade, who was in charge of managing 
the accession process, headed the coor-
dination structure. His main responsibil-
ity was to define the objectives and to 
define Bulgaria’s negotiation priorities.  
During the course of the accession proc-
ess, a second, more technical coordina-
tion structure emerged. Headed by the 
Chief Negotiator, the group was com-
posed of civil servants working at Direc-
tor General level (or lower). The main 
task was to arbitrate divergent views 
between ministries before they reached 
the ministerial level (see 2.2.3). 
The Kyrgyz Republic was - due to the 
country's political priority of gaining 
accession before China and Russia had 
joined the organization - the candidate 
with the quickest accession time in 
entering the global trade body to date.  A 
powerful “Commission on Negotiations 
with the WTO” managed the inter-
ministerial coordination process. Based 
on a Prime Minister’s Decree, the mem-
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bers of this commission were fully au-
thorized to negotiate on behalf of the 
Kyrgyz Republic. The commission was 
chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister, 
who also holds the position of the Minis-
ter of Trade. Relevant government enti-
ties delegated one representative each. 
Since not enough local WTO expertise 
was available, and because of language 
problems, technical input for the IMC 
units work was provided mainly by a 
USAID-supported group of WTO pro-
fessionals (Foreign Trade Memorandum, 
translation of national legislation into 
English, initial offer for services etc.). 
The IMC unit – including the Trade 
Minister – were given one month of 
technical training at the WTO in Geneva.   
During the accession process, the par-
liament has not played the role assigned 
to it by the constitution. There were no 
national experts with some background 
in WTO that were at the same time 
members of the national assembly or 
relevant sub-committees. Because of the 
parliament’s capacity constraints, the 
ratification process proceeded on a 
largely uncontroversial course. Although 
the accession process may have been 
relatively painless, the compromises 
made produced serious strains which 
today have led the parliament and the 
business sector to form an awkward 
alliance against the government’s far-
reaching commitments.  
In Vietnam, in the process of accession 
to GATT/WTO since 1994, integration-
related coordination work is done more 
or less simultaneously by three adminis-
trative bodies: at the (1) Ministry of 
Trade (MoT) the Multilateral Trade 
Policy Dept. prepares all documents 
geared to advancing the accession proc-
ess. The (2) National Committee for 
International Economic Cooperation 
(NCIEC) was established in 1998 to 
“assist the Prime Minister in directing 
and coordinating ministries and local 
governments in […] negotiating access 
and participation in the WTO as well as 
other international and regional trade-
related organizations”5. Chaired by a 
Deputy Prime Minister, the 20-member 
institutions (ministries as well as the 
Communist Party’s Economic Commis-
sion) ensure their commitment by send-
ing high-ranking officials (usually a 
deputy minister) to the regular coordina-
tion meetings. The national Negotiation 
Team, which is headed by a deputy 
minister of trade, was attached to the 
NCIEC in early 2001. Finally, the (3) 
Government Office also lays claim to 
responsibility for coordination. Here, the 
International Economic Organization 
Division is in charge of facilitating 
interaction between ministries. Letters 
and requests on WTO-related issues 
from ministries submitted to the Prime 
Minister must go through this division.  
Since responsibilities between the three 
bodies are not well defined, coordination 
work has lacked coherence during the 
past few years.6 With the recent increase 
in WTO activities, the present coordina-
tion mechanism has turned out to be 
inefficient and insufficiently focused to 
satisfy the needs of a targeted integration 
                                                 
5 Decision 31/1998/QD-TTg of 10 February 
1998. 
6 For this reason, one expert of the Vietnamese 
Prime Minister’s Research Commission 
(PMRC) labeled the present coordination 
mechanism “liquid.” 
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road map (yet to be worked out!).For 
this reason, the government of Vietnam 
has started to think about some institu-
tional changes in coordinating integra-
tion efforts.  
Another, more sophisticated, approach to 
post-accession IMC is pursued by India.7 
Based on a civil service system with 
strong British traditions, the focus of 
WTO-related activities lies with the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. At 
the Ministry’s Trade Policy Division, a 
WTO Unit (headed by a “Special Secre-
tary WTO”) comprises about three sub-
units dedicated to GATT, GATS, and 
TRIPs issues. Approximately 20 experts, 
12 of them junior officials, are exclu-
sively occupied with WTO matters. All 
specialists have attended WTO Trade 
Policy Courses and Dispute Settlement 
Courses in Geneva.  
The Permanent Mission plays a vital role 
in this targeted system of coordination 
(see 2.2.1, information). Staff from the 
Ministry’s WTO unit therefore works on 
a job-rotation basis in Geneva, which 
means posting changes every 3-4 years.8 
One ambassador's work is devoted en-
tirely to the WTO and is supported by up 
to six trade specialists (including some 
lawyers with a sound background in 
domestic trade legislation). In order to 
provide officials from functional minis-
tries with an inside perspective of the 
global trade body, more or less regular 
                                                 
                                                
7 India is a well-established GATT ’47 mem-
ber and has one of the most dynamic WTO 
missions to Geneva of all developing coun-
tries. 
8 One reason is to avoid vested interests or 
making some professionals believe that they 
are indispensable. 
visits are organized for their participa-
tion in WTO Councils or Committee 
meetings. 
2.1.2. Resources and daily opera-
tions of the IMC unit  
The case of India’s Permanent Mission 
clearly demonstrates the high priority the 
capital has accorded to an active, dy-
namic WTO membership. The endow-
ment and the internal organization of the 
mission reflect this political determina-
tion very clearly. However, since inter-
vention in specific WTO committees 
requires substantial effort, the way in 
which membership obligations are met 
depends first and foremost on the finan-
cial and human resources available, as 
well as on language capacities and the 
strength of the support structures in the 
capital. 
Inter-ministerial coordination is usually 
performed by a small group of well-
trained experts. In Lithuania the IMC 
unit at MoFA comprises six profession-
als, four of which work solely on WTO 
issues. The Kyrgyz Republic had a coor-
dination group of ten specialists from 
different line ministries. The members of 
Bulgaria’s IMC group were personally 
appointed with an eye to ensuring the 
continuity necessary to cope with the 
realities of a protracted process. The 
accession of Moldova was handled 
basically by 5-6 experts at the WTO 
Department of the Ministry for Economy 
and Reform9. And even in important 
trading nations like Germany, the re-
 
9 One difficulty for Moldova’s WTO accession 
was training people and retaining them in 
public administration. The department suf-
fered from considerable “brain drain.”  
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sponsible department at the Federal 
Ministry of Economics (BMWi) consists 
of only 5 professionals.  However, addi-
tional experts in two other departments 
are also working on specific WTO issues 
like TRIPs, Antidumping, Customs 
Valuation etc.10  
In contrast to the above-named WTO 
members, Vietnam’s quantitative en-
dowment with trade-related human 
resources is remarkable. At MoT’s 
Multilateral Trade Policy Dept. 11 pro-
fessionals are concerned with WTO 
matters (total staff: 32 experts). The 
NCIEC Office comprises 6 specialists 
(2001) plus the Secretary General. At the 
Government Office’s Department 
roughly 2-3 officials are entrusted with 
coordination duties. So the main obstacle 
to effective coordination is likely to be 
less a quantitative lack of coordination 
capacity then the unsolved problem of 
vague responsibilities and the bureau-
cratic power struggles this entails. 
The frequency of formal coordination 
meetings varies considerably. Depending 
on stage of accession and level of cen-
tralization, meeting frequency ranged 
from a monthly basis to daily fine-
tuning. In Moldova as well as in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the IMC unit met once 
per month (if necessary – e. g. before 
important negotiations – more often). 
“Solid” coordination was achieved in 
Lithuania. The Economic Department at 
MoFA organized more or less daily 
coordination gatherings. These meetings 
also verified the conformity of legisla-
tion prepared by line ministries. Croatia 
had no fixed meeting mechanism. Coor-
dination meetings were held as the need 
arose, on average every 2-3 weeks. 
During peak periods, the Inter-
ministerial Working Group initiated 
daily meetings to solve urgent problems. 
One thing that changed over time in 
Croatia as well was the attendance at 
those conventions. In the early stage of 
accession all players had a stake in WTO 
issues, and thus participation was high. 
The more technical the process became, 
the fewer officials were present at the 
meetings. In Vietnam, the National 
Committee assembles every 2-3 months. 
The deputy ministers exchange views on 
and debate WTO-related issues. Techni-
cal coordination at the line ministry 
level, however, is weak. Lateral consul-
tations take place only on initiative of 
the MoT to demand written answers to 
questions from the members of the WTO 
Working Party. The line ministries have 
very seldom been more active in putting 
forward proposals in their sphere of 
responsibility.  
2.2. Functional variables 
                                                 
Beside institutional aspects and the 
paramount technical question of how to 
organize the coordination mechanism in 
such a way that it fits the administrative 
tradition of an (acceding) member coun-
try, a need could arise for some basic 
analytical tools for national coordination 
mechanisms. For this purpose, and based 
10 It must be stressed here that in the WTO 
context the function of the BMWi is to for-
mulate national bargaining positions only. 
Since the 15 member states of the European 
Union have a common commercial policy 
toward non-member countries, national trade 
negotiation authority was transferred to the 
Commission’s DG Trade in Brussels. The 
main basis of the common commercial policy 
is Article 133 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997). 
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on the interviews conducted in Geneva 
and Hanoi, several core functions have 
been identified that are perceived as 
essential for efficient trade-related coor-
dination work:  
1. Internal dissemination of informa-
tion,  
2. Preparation of and packaging for 
negotiations,  
3. Arbitration and conciliation of 
contentious points,  
4. Ensuring cross-sector cohesive-
ness, and 
– at least for developing countries or 
economies  in transition –  
5. Facilitation of a meaningful alloca-
tion of technical assistance.  
These functions have – as discussed 
below - to be ensured by the coordina-
tion unit in charge of developing, main-
taining, and defending a common line of 
national negotiation positions. Moreover, 
these parameters serve as a first refer-
ence point for assessing the performance 
of the coordination arrangement decided 
on.  
2.2.1. Internal dissemination of 
information 
The most eminent function of cross-
institutional coordination is information. 
In bureaucratic politics, information is 
power. The flow of information from the 
WTO (and it’s environment) via the 
Permanent Mission in Geneva back to 
the capital must be well organized in 
order to provide a sound basis for deci-
sion-making.  
What is needed to overcome barriers to 
communication are norms and conven-
tions which oblige officials to maintain 
adequate flows of information across 
organizational boundaries.11 Often, the 
information required must be obtained 
from a wide variety of outside sources, 
domestic and foreign, and then assem-
bled and recast to fit the needs of various 
ministries responsible for different as-
pects of trade policy. Relevant key 
persons and institutions must be kept 
informed. Decision-makers must arrive 
well briefed at the right time at the right 
place. The center of the government 
must receive regular, unbiased written 
and verbal reports on the accession or 
negotiation progress. 
Clear and complete communication is 
particularly critical when the Mission to 
Geneva is engaged in advocating inter-
nally agreed-on bargaining positions. 
The mission is the “information broker” 
or “spearhead” of the national trade 
authorities. It is the most important 
interface between the global trade body 
and the national administration and has 
to be organized, trained, and equipped in 
keeping with these requirements. 
Dissemination of information is not only 
relevant for facilitating communication 
within administrations. Since WTO 
membership impacts on business, ad-
ministration, as well as many other 
issues under public law, the IMC unit 
should initiate and contribute substan-
tially to keeping the general public 
informed about the accession process 
(e.g. through publications, broadcasts, 
                                                 
11 An interesting example for such a code of 
conduct (which also has practical relevance 
for arbitrating disputed issues) is given in 
Raiffa, Howard: The Art & Science of Nego-
tiation, Cambridge 1982, pp. 341f. 
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etc.)12, and - once full membership has 
been achieved - about WTO develop-
ments and trade-related events of na-
tional interest.13  
The interviews conducted in Geneva 
have clearly demonstrated that distribu-
tion of information is organized in very 
different ways. Usually, the arrangement 
decided on outlasts the phase of acces-
sion and remains more or less unchanged 
after full membership is achieved.  
In Lithuania all mission reports were 
channeled through the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. Since the focus of interest 
of some line ministries varied considera-
bly, MoFA filtered and forwarded only 
the information that was “necessary” for 
the other line ministries to understand 
actual WTO developments.  
Croatia followed another line. During 
accession, there was frequent communi-
cation between the mission and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Economy, as well as the IMC unit. The 
Inter-ministerial Working Group briefed 
other line ministries, compiled their 
responses, and tried to achieve consen-
sus about decisions. Occasional meetings 
with several parliamentary committees 
were held to keep them informed, the 
aim being to facilitate the ratification 
procedure later on. The negotiation team 
under the Inter-ministerial Working 
Group reported to the cabinet on a 
weekly basis on progress made as well 
as on issues of concern. In summary, 
distribution of information was well 
organized within the government appara-
tus and provided relevant players with 
the basic facts they needed for decision-
making.  
The Permanent Mission of Moldova 
reported to the Chief Negotiator at the 
Ministry of Economy and Reform, rarely 
to MoFA, which is in charge of missions 
abroad. As described in Chapter 2.1.1, 
considerable political friction was 
caused by this decision and required 
repeated replacement of the chief nego-
tiator. Thus it can be supposed that the 
decision on how to channel what infor-
mation channeled to whom substantially 
affected not only the pace of accession 
but also the actual outcome of the nego-
tiations. 
                                                 
                                                
Vietnam’s Mission's WTO-related re-
ports are submitted on a regular basis to 
the Ministry of Trade, the Multilateral 
Economic Relations Dept. of the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, and the Office of 
the National Committee for International 
Economic Cooperation. Among those 
key-players, the MoT has, however, a 
comfortable information lead over other 
domestic stakeholders. At present, the 
responsible department in the ministry 
receives much more (background) in-
formation from Geneva because of its 
close (informal)14 link to the Mission’s 
staff. Moreover, the flow of WTO-
related information within the admini-
stration seems not to be adequately 
12 Despite the constant need to disseminate 
information widely on the domestic front, it 
must be carefully targeted (as regards audi-
ence, scope and channels of information).   
 
13 Usually, research institutions, business 
associations, and civil society groups mirror, 
complement or, comment on the information 
provided by the government.  
14 The Mission’s WTO staff are former MoT 
(MTPD) experts and have established an ad-
ditional, very informal information channel.  
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organized. Only occasionally do other 
line ministries receive updated informa-
tion from Geneva.15 For this reason many 
officials are concerned about the lack of 
accession-relevant information from 
Geneva and complain that they are 
impeded in meeting their WTO-related 
duties because of the clogged informa-
tion channel. 
Beyond the accession experience it is 
important to know how well-established 
WTO members organize their internal 
flow of information: India’s permanent 
mission, for instance, is instructed to 
attend all (!) WTO meetings and to 
report to the capital. The leading Minis-
try of Commerce and Industry is very 
much aware that the bulk of key deci-
sions taken in Geneva are made during 
informal meetings outside the organiza-
tion. If a member is not present (and 
perceptible!) at formal WTO meetings, 
its mission representatives are not in-
vited to participate in the more relevant 
meetings in restaurants or private clubs 
outside the organization. When reporting 
to the capital, special attention is given 
to the standpoints and proposals of the 
four eminent players in global trade, the 
“Quad.” Then, the announcements of 
other active members such as Australia, 
Switzerland, Brazil, Argentina, ASEAN 
are covered in a faithful written account. 
The Ministry of Commerce in Delhi 
filters these reports, and relevant sec-
tions are forwarded to the line ministries 
concerned or in some cases even to 
                                                 
15 Most of them are not aware of the WTO’s 
online document database. An additional 
problem is language. A basic knowledge of 
English is not enough to understand the tech-
nical language of the official documents pro-
duced by or for the WTO.  
companies. The reports form the basis of 
a newsletter (“India & the WTO”) com-
piled by MoCI and distributed freely. 
The German approach is somewhat 
different. Due to European integration, 
the mission is basically an information 
interface (“ear” but not “mouth”). Its 
reports are directed to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Copies of these reports 
are cabled to the leading Ministry for 
Economics, relevant line ministries, 
embassies concerned, the Germany 
missions in Brussels (EU) and Paris 
(OECD). Since final decision-making 
takes place after European consensus is 
reached in Brussels, delegates attend 
most of the meetings without instruc-
tions from Berlin. The mission collects 
only issues and opinions and forwards 
them to the capital for internal discus-
sion and national policy formulation. 
The information link is therefore not a 
bilateral issue between the mission and 
the ministry; it is more a triangular 
connection between Geneva, Berlin, and 
Brussels.  
In addition to the internal distribution of 
information inside the government appa-
ratus, the way in which the business 
community and the general public were 
informed during accession differed 
widely among the interviewed member 
countries. WTO Reference Centers, set 
up to enable officials of the government, 
business, and academic communities to 
obtain trade-related information, were 
established after (!) accession. In the 
Kyrgyz Republic a center of this kind 
was set up under the authority of the 
central coordination unit. As in Vietnam, 
such centers are yet to be set up in the 
other recently joined countries (Croatia, 
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Lithuania, Moldova)16. Interim results of 
the accession process were made public 
only in Moldova. During the negotia-
tions, the IMC unit published all offers 
(goods & services) in the official gazette, 
allowing the business community to take 
notice of the commitments made. 
2.2.2. Packaging and repackaging 
for negotiations 
During accession, concessions on market 
access for trade in goods and in services 
have to be made and adapted in several 
rounds of negotiations. Whereas respon-
sibility for the first-named offer falls - 
due to its budgetary implications – pri-
marily under the portfolio of the Minis-
try of Finance – and hence the process of 
formulating a negotiation position is 
basically a bi-ministerial process be-
tween MoFin and the ministry responsi-
ble for trade issues – the picture for 
services is quite different. Since jurisdic-
tion for banking, insurance, telecommu-
nication, construction, wholesale & retail 
trade, financial, legal or other business 
services is usually divided among sev-
eral line ministries, compiling and agree-
ing upon common negotiating positions 
is a delicate and time-consuming proc-
ess. Regardless of the constitutional set 
and the power of the coordination unit, 
line ministries can find many ways to 
obstruct, complicate, and delay the 
formulation of market access conces-
sions. Securing support from the very 
center of the government for smoothing 
the drafting of (initial) offers and the 
packaging of negotiations are therefore 
another basic function of the coordina-
tion unit.  
Individual offers, elaborated independ-
ently by line ministries within their own 
area of competence, are compiled and 
processed according to WTO standards 
by the coordination unit. Divergent 
views on market access in subsectors of 
overlapping or neighboring competence 
must be solved though a structured 
dialogue between ministries concerned 
(i. e. through an arbitration framework or 
other clear procedures, see 2.2.3).17 
Once disagreements have been settled, 
the internal room for maneuver in WTO 
negotiations must be explored. Thus the 
different national stakeholders are en-
couraged to indicate their maximum 
bargaining position.18 Based on the 
identification of national leeways (under 
given conditions and at a given time!), 
and only after the interests and sore spots 
of foreign negotiation partner(s) have 
been given due consideration, national 
bargaining strategies (including “bar-
gaining chips”) and scenarios must be 
elaborated jointly.19 The IMC unit has 
                                                 
                                                 
17 Here, informal communication on the expert 
level is often the key to overcoming dis-
agreements between ministries! 
18 Because this procedure might be overshad-
owed by previous disputes, it requires sincere 
conciliation and much trust among parties 
involved to ensure optimal negotiation re-
sults. 
19 See also Saner, Raymond: The Expert Nego-
tiator. Strategy, Tactics, Motivation, Behav-
ior, Leadership, The Hague 2000; Kre-
menyuk, Victor (ed.): International negotia-
tion. Analysis, Approaches, Issues, San Fran-
cisco 2002; Grossman, Gene & Helpman, El-
hanan: Interest Groups and Trade Policy, 
Princeton 2002. 
16 Since these new members were requested to 
accede as a “Developed Country” (!), they 
have no access to the WTO Technical Assis-
tance Funds, which sponsor e.g. the estab-
lishment of such Reference Centers. 
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the vital function to ensure that this task 
is achieved efficiently and on time. 
The next steps include forwarding of the 
negotiation package to the center of the 
government for approval and formula-
tion of instructions for the national 
negotiation team and/or the Permanent 
Mission to Geneva.  
Since the dynamics of negotiations often 
requires flexibility and quick responses, 
an overall package may have to be un-
tied, regrouped, and repackaged. The 
IMC unit's task is to facilitate this proc-
ess by supporting the chief negotiator. 
This means not only ensuring that he is 
in a position to respond to suddenly 
emerging needs for strategy adjustments 
beyond what was previously agreed to, 
but also seeing to it that relevant domes-
tic stakeholders are kept abreast of de-
velopments and understand the negotia-
tor’s position. One important function of 
the coordinating body is therefore to act 
as an “honest broker” of the chief nego-
tiator. 
Packaging of negotiation positions in 
Lithuania was done by MoFA with the 
strong support of the Prime Minister, the 
President, and the Speaker of the Parlia-
ment. The political commitment of the 
government to join WTO within a rea-
sonable time frame made possible a 
smooth packaging process without any 
long-lasting frictions.20 In the Kyrgyz 
Republic the formulation of national 
bargaining positions also made rapid 
progress. Since the Ministry of Trade 
prepared both the initial and as well as 
further offers on goods, and, since 
                                                 
                                                
20 Difficulties occurred only concerning agricul-
ture issues, see Section 2.2.3 on arbitration. 
USAID-supported experts were in 
charge of the more complex service 
sector, no major problems occurred 
during the preparation process.  
In Moldova packaging efforts were the 
task of the WTO Department. For goods, 
some extra preparation time was neces-
sary because the offer had to be updated 
into the HS01 format. Since Moldova 
has little domestic service industry and 
was in greater need of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), no conscientious 
consideration was devoted to maximum 
market access concessions during prepa-
ration for negotiations. All interim re-
sults were approved by the Inter-
ministerial Committee on Accession to 
WTO without any substantial disputes. 
It was only recently that Vietnam gath-
ered experience with WTO-related 
negotiation packaging. Initial offers on 
trade in goods and in services were 
submitted in early 2002. Formulating a 
national negotiation position turned out 
to be in particularly difficult for the 
service sector.21 Political reservations 
and misperceptions of relevant WTO 
provisions by some line ministries pro-
tracted a straightforward formulation of 
the country's initial offers. Another 
hampering factor was the unclear divi-
sion of labor between MoT, the National 
Committee (NCIEC), and the Govern-
ment Office. The former practice of 
submitting proposals of line ministries 
individually either to the Multilateral 
 
21 Frictions occurred in the goods sector too. 
Achieving consensus about tariff concessions 
was difficult for MoT and the Ministry of Fi-
nance. Since some state-owned enterprises 
lobbied for continued protection, the initial 
offer was “not stable.” 
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Trade Policy Department (of MoT), the 
NCIEC, or the Government Office was 
confusing and hampered the elaboration 
of a consistent and coherent national 
bargaining position. Meanwhile, the 
government of Vietnam has taken some 
first steps to streamline the preparation 
procedure. 
Some established WTO members have, 
however, cultivated a complex packag-
ing procedure. In India, identification of 
bargaining positions is facilitated by a 
“National Trade Committee” which 
meets under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Commerce. Every three weeks repre-
sentatives from business associations, 
district organizations, NGOs as well as 
senior government officials get together 
to provide input on the position India 
should take on WTO issues. Before each 
meeting the topic is fixed by the ministry 
and participants are encouraged to pre-
pare position papers. A final summary is 
made by the ministry after discussions.22 
If necessary, responsible line ministries 
provide more input for the formulation 
of national bargaining positions. Then 
the Secretary of Commerce finalizes the 
common line of defense as well as the 
instructions for the mission to Geneva. 
The Minister of Commerce approves 
both proposals. 
Due to European integration, packaging 
for negotiations in Germany (as in the 
other EU member states as well) is 
handled in a very special way. Formula-
tion of national bargaining positions, for 
the Ministerial Meeting in Doha (No-
vember 2001) for instance, was guided 
by the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology. Issues and opinions of 
other line ministries, e.g. the views of 
the Federal Ministry for the Environ-
ment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety (BUMi) about trade and environ-
mental standards23 or of the Federal 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food 
and Agriculture (BMVEL) about liberal-
izing agricultural imports, were collected 
by the BMWi. Business associations, 
research institutions etc. likewise for-
warded their comments to the lead min-
istry, the  Economics Ministry. The 
BMWi extracted - under consideration of 
given national economic interests and 
the usually well-known negotiation 
positions of other EU members - the 
jointly agreed instructions for participat-
ing in the so-called “133 Committee” in 
Brussels.  
2.2.3. Arbitration and conciliation  
                                                 
                                                
One essential element of any packaging 
process for negotiations is a smoothly 
functioning system of arbitration and 
conciliation. The function of the coordi-
nation unit in this regard is to moderate 
domestic differences internally. During 
accession negotiations (working out 
initial offers, concluding bilateral trade 
agreements, negotiations about WTO 
rules), it is first and foremost govern-
22 The main purpose of this body is not to 
delegate government decision-making power 
to civil society groups. Beside identifying 
and conciliating critical issues, it is rather a 
tool for “teaching” the various national play-
ers the dynamics of (and sometimes the very 
limited national impact on) WTO policy. 
 
23 Other ministries involved are (for this issue) 
the Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, 
Food and Agriculture (BMVEL) or the Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ). 
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mental entities that are concerned with 
arbitration.24 
Beyond the need for intra-governmental 
arbitration, the business community also 
demands that its concerns about market 
access concessions be heard. Whether 
these are taken into account during the 
formulation of national bargaining posi-
tions depends on development priorities, 
economic as well as political parameters, 
and the influence of lobby groups serv-
ing the interests of specific sec-
tors/industries.25  
In Lithuania disputes occurred mainly 
between MoFA and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. One contentious issue was 
the level of protection for dairy products, 
meat (pork, poultry), sugar, as well as 
support (subsidies) for agriculture. Since 
it turned out during the discussion with 
the WTO members that the desired result 
was not likely to be achieved, tensions 
arose about the negotiation strategy. The 
Ministry of Agriculture opted for a delay 
in the negotiations. MoFA was much in 
favor of a revision of the domestic agri-
cultural policy in order to comply with 
the time frame set for full WTO mem-
bership.  
The first attempt to solve the problem 
was made at the level of the Vice Minis-
ter. Finally, the case had to be arbitrated 
by the Prime Minister. This progressive 
                                                 
                                                
24 For example, disputes between the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Trade about 
the budgetary impact of tariff reductions or 
the selection of subsectors or industries 
which are considered to maintain a certain 
level of protection etc. 
25 See also Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, 
Elhana: Interest Groups and Trade Policy, 
Princeton 2002. 
model of arbitrating conflicts worked 
well in other (minor) cases as well and 
helped to reduce the workload for the top 
level of government. 
Moldova had no such deliberate system 
of arbitration. Since the country trades 
mainly with Russia and Ukraine (65 % 
of all external trade) and, moreover, 
WTO membership was perceived as 
absolutely necessary as a means of 
demonstrating and maintaining national 
sovereignty, no major disputes about 
market access concessions in goods or 
services surfaced. The only concern was 
some resistance of the Customs Depart-
ment regarding implementation of the 
Customs Valuation Agreement. But even 
here clear WTO rules and Moldova’s 
dependence on ODA26 allowed little 
leeway for negotiations. 
In Bulgaria divergent views between 
line ministries were arbitrated by the 
chief negotiator. Because his close per-
sonal relations within the negotiation 
team, the chief negotiator was able to 
solve the main conflicts with the repre-
sentatives of the various ministries 
before they reached the ministerial level. 
It was only when no conciliation was 
feasible that controversial issues were 
forwarded to the next arbitration level. 
No formal mediation mechanism was 
established to that end.  
Once the initial internal difficulties were 
overcome, inter-ministerial arbitration in 
Croatia proved to be well organized. 
Issues under dispute were in most cases 
solved during the frequent coordination 
meetings. Where no agreement could be 
 
26 About 60 % of national income comes from 
ODA sources.  
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reached, the problem was forwarded to a 
higher level by the IMC unit. In particu-
lar agricultural issues (domestic support, 
transition periods) gave rise to some 
need for arbitration, since the resistance 
of several WTO members to concessions 
was stronger than expected. The corre-
sponding experience of the Chief Nego-
tiator had to be explained to national 
stakeholders.  
Trade-related inter-ministerial arbitration 
is an extraordinarily difficult issue in 
Vietnam. Since only a few of the line 
ministries (beside MoT) were able to 
send some of their staff to training 
courses abroad,27 WTO-related knowl-
edge is rare and not equally distributed 
among government entities. Moreover, 
because line ministries insist strongly on 
their autonomy and try to avoid sharing 
(ODA) resources beyond institutional 
boundaries, lateral arbitration capacities 
are weak.  
A structured dialogue aimed at overcom-
ing institutional barriers at the technical 
level is still in its infancy. Even the 
National Committee (NCIEC) is not 
perceived as an independent unit that 
aims at facilitating interaction among 
ministries and other government entities. 
Partly due to the fact that the budget and 
staff of the Committee’s secretariat is 
allocated through the Ministry of 
Trade,28 most ministries have doubts 
about the effectiveness of the commit-
tee’s arbitration function (and capacity), 
a fact that sometimes leads to obstruc-
tion and concealed lobbying for individ-
ual ministry positions.  
Due to their longer and different admin-
istrative traditions, arbitration proce-
dures in well-established WTO members 
are somewhat more complex than in 
recently acceded member countries. 
India, for instance, first tries to settle 
disputed issues on an expert level among 
the ministries concerned. If no accord 
can be reached, the case is forwarded to 
the “Inter-ministerial Meeting of the 
Cabinet,” which is chaired by the Prime 
Minister. Each party writes a “Cabinet 
Note” that elaborates on the problem and 
the position of the ministry concerned. 
Based on the written statements, the 
Prime Minister then decides.  
                                                 
                                                
A different procedure is established in 
Germany. Because line ministries are 
provided with a high degree of auton-
omy, arbitration of critical issues falls 
within the authority of the so-called 
“lead ministry,” but remains basically a 
voluntary matter.29 The lead ministry 
seeks consensus with other ministries 
concerned. Agreement on a cabinet bill 
or any other proposal which requires 
inter-ministerial consensus is indicated 
by a written comment of the ministries 
concerned that the document has found 
approval. If differences among ministries 
cannot be settled by compromise and 
mutual adjustment, there is generally 
reluctance to force the issue because 
27 See also the insightful report of Pannatier, 
Serge: Assessment of Vietnam’s institutional 
and human infrastructure for the formulation 
of trade policy and the undertaking of multi-
lateral trade negotiations, restricted report 
prepared for UNDP Hanoi’s Project 
VIE/95/024. May 2000. 
 
29 The Chancellor has some powers to coordi-
nate in general. But administrative traditions 
and coalition politics act counter to strong 
central coordination. 
28 Moreover, the NCIEC is physically located in 
the offices of the MoT. 
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there is no guaranteed process of arbitra-
tion. However, despite the lack of clear 
conflict-solving capacities, it is impor-
tant to note that the ministry level has 
generally high standards of competence 
and is endowed with sufficient re-
sources. Policy coordination is therefore 
highly reliant on horizontal working 
relations and voluntary consensus-
seeking. 
Thoughtful arbitration and conciliation 
with the business community reduces the 
risk that justified complaints will be 
lodged when commitments entered into 
are to be implemented after (accession) 
negotiations. The interviews held in 
Geneva clearly indicated that, due to the 
strong centralist traditions of transition 
economies and because of the resistance 
expected against any lowering of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, most of acceding 
member countries have neglected the 
wish of the business community to 
provide its own opinions and inputs for 
the negotiations.  
In Croatia industry and service providers 
were consulted during accession negotia-
tions but were not allowed to participate 
directly in the IMC unit’s meetings (with 
very the few exceptions of some “impor-
tant” associations or companies). Things 
went much worse in the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic. The business community had no 
opportunity to express its concerns about 
commitments made. Neither state-owned 
nor private enterprises were allowed to 
raise their voice, directly or indirectly, in 
the Negotiations Commission. Today, 
this has resulted in serious complaints by 
domestic industries and service provid-
ers that the government has conceded 
too much too fast.  
In Vietnam, a formal mechanism for 
involving the business sector in WTO 
negotiations is only beginning to 
emerge. In the past, individual compa-
nies or corporations (SOEs as well as 
some prominent Joint Ventures in car, 
motorbike or cement production) have 
aired, in a non-transparent way, their 
opinion about the reduction of protective 
barriers.30 An official link between the 
Ministry of Trade and Vietnam’s Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) 
was not established before the year 
200031 when the newly appointed Minis-
ter of Trade met the Chairman of VCCI 
to ease the complicated relations be-
tween the two institutions. So those who 
are actually affected by or benefit from 
WTO membership have had few chances 
to express their views in a structured, 
open dialogue.  
2.2.4. Ensuring cross-sector  
conformity 
During accession, current members seek 
assurances that the applicant will fully 
abide by all binding WTO rules. Existing 
legislation is scrutinized for its consis-
tency with WTO agreements and, in 
particular, the possibilities to bring it 
into conformity where necessary. Since 
other WTO provisions leave room for 
interpretation – i. e. commitments and 
transition periods are negotiable – the 
applicant’s inter-ministerial coordination 
unit has two functions: First, the appli-
cant should try to achieve sufficient 
internal cross-sector “cohesiveness” to 
                                                 
30 Resulting in discretionary tariff peaks and/or 
the imposition of NTBs (non-tariff barriers). 
31 I.e. five years after applying for membership. 
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defend a common line of shared national 
interests. Second, but building on the 
first demand, a deliberate mechanism for 
ensuring the conformity of government 
decisions with corresponding WTO rules 
must be developed and maintained. 
Lithuania met these challenges by means 
of intensive screening of national legisla-
tion, which was carried out by MoFA. 
All WTO-related legislation drafted by 
line ministries was checked at the expert 
level before it was submitted to a higher 
(political) level. Moldova and Kyrgyz 
achieved cross-sector conformity more 
easily because EU and USAID experts 
drafted relevant legislation. In the Kyr-
gyz Republic a new department solely 
responsible for the “conformity check” 
was established at the MoT. Today this 
department fulfills the notification re-
quirements32 for WTO membership. In 
Croatia, the IMC unit brought national 
legislation into conformity with WTO 
norms before the government entered 
into in-depth negotiations with the mem-
bers of the global trade body. Not only 
were customs regulations in full compli-
ance with corresponding WTO agree-
ments, the same applied for IPR issues 
and anti-dumping legislation as well.  
In Bulgaria, lack of trade-related exper-
tise was a big challenge at the beginning 
of the accession process and hindered 
the formulation of legal documents in 
conformity with WTO standards. The 
problem was partially overcome by the 
organization of a training course for 
government officials involved in the 
accession process. All the teaching 
material was translated into Bulgarian 
and distributed in advance to the partici-
pants. Organized by a private law firm, 
this course was very helpful to partici-
pants in understanding the basic princi-
ples of the multilateral trading system 
and later facilitated the drafting of legis-
lation in conformity with the WTO and 
formulation enforcement regulations.  
Vietnam has gained some comparable 
experiences. Examination of trade-
related legislation is progressing only 
gradually because of a lack of qualified 
human resources. The Law Department 
of the Office of the National Assembly is 
bogged down with other tasks and - thus 
far - not entitled to support the “confor-
mity check”. And revision by the Minis-
try of Justice, which has set up a corre-
sponding working group, is also slow in 
pace. Since the establishment of an 
expert panel in mid-2000, only 148 legal 
documents of central authorities have 
been reviewed.33 Legal documents of 
provincial authorities have not yet been 
inspected.  
                                                 
                                                
Precautionary capacities are also weak in 
Vietnam. The “WTO Desks” at the line 
ministries have severe difficulties in 
making sure that legal documents to be 
issued by their ministries are in line with 
WTO provisions. Frequent staffing 
32 In order to achieve greater coherence in 
global economic policy-making, the WTO 
members have enforced a general obligation 
to report to the relevant body of the WTO the 
adoption of trade measures that might have 
an effect on the members of the WTO agree-
ments (e.g. tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
other non-tariff measures, technical barriers 
to trade, safeguard action, anti-dumping 
measures, etc.) 
 
33 About 50 % of the examined legislation has 
been found to be inconsistent with WTO pro-
visions, and thus in need of amendment, re-
newal or rescission. 
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changes and limited attendance at trade-
related capacity-building measures 
(training courses etc.) have meant that 
insufficient note has been taken of WTO 
principles.  
Meanwhile, WTO accession has as-
sumed top priority for the newly ap-
pointed government. The Ministry of 
Justice has therefore announced the 
setting up of a “Department for Integra-
tion Legislation” to facilitate ex-post 
compliance with the WTO rules.34 Other 
line ministries may also be expected to 
strengthen their WTO capacities in the 
near future as well. 
Difficulties in achieving conformity with 
WTO rules are not limited to small 
transition economies. According to one 
(Russian) UNCTAD official, Russia 
initially set up a unit of 3-4 professionals 
at the President’s office, but it turned out 
that this approach was not sufficient. 
Therefore, an “Experts Council” was 
attached to Parliament; its aim is to 
verify WTO conformity before bills are 
discussed in parliament. Independent 
units at the line ministry level were 
perceived as inappropriate and ineffec-
tive for achieving cross-sector confor-
mity. 
2.2.5. Facilitating the meaningful 
allocation of technical  
assistance 
In practice, WTO accession and mem-
bership require a huge set of different 
capacities that are, in most cases, not 
sufficiently available when the decision 
is made to join the global trade body. 
                                                 
                                                
34 Phap Luat Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, 10 June 
2002, p. 1. 
Particularly transition economies face 
serious difficulties in fulfilling the re-
quirements for compiling the informa-
tion requested during the fact-finding 
phase and in effectively negotiating the 
conditions of accession with the other 
WTO members. Furthermore, implemen-
tation of some WTO agreements (such 
as SPS, TBT and CVA) calls for com-
prehensive trade-related technical assis-
tance (TRTA) to help alleviate the bur-
den of membership obligations. 
On a global scale, the demand for WTO-
related technical assistance exceeds by 
far the resources which are made avail-
able - e.g. within the “Doha Develop-
ment Agenda”, the “Integrated Frame-
work” or by other multilateral or bilat-
eral sources. At least for developing 
countries and economies in transition, 
another significant function of national 
trade-related coordination body is to 
create transparency about the TA needs 
of various domestic stakeholders.35  
None of the missions interviewed indi-
cated that their country has systemati-
cally carried out a TRTA needs-
assessment study. Not only because 
technical assistance was scarce (or not 
sufficiently requested to come up to the 
needs), but also because applicants were 
under considerable pressure to accede to 
WTO under “Developed Country” 
status. Aside from severe implications 
for negotiations on Special and Differen-
 
35 For a more comprehensive debate on TRTA, 
see OECD: The DAC Guidelines. 
Strengthening Trade Capacity for Devel-
opment, Paris 2001 or Kostecki, Michel: 
Technical Assistance Services in Trade 
Policy. A Contribution to the Discussion on 
Capacity-building in the WTO, ICTSD 
Resource Paper No. 2, Geneva 2001. 
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tial Treatment (S&D), transition periods 
etc., another impact is the limited access 
to technical assistance offered by the 
WTO.  
Moreover, since technical assistance 
takes time to be mobilized – depending 
on the donor, between 1-2 years – 
emerging needs are difficult to meet 
during “peak times” of the transparency 
phase or during negotiations on the time 
frame for compliance with WTO rules or 
market access issues. The general prob-
lem is that during the first phase of 
accession there is a lack of local appre-
ciation of future needs for support and 
advice. Consequently, when the need 
becomes apparent and urgent, it is very 
difficult to mobilize sufficient donor 
support on short notice.  
In the Kyrgyz Republic basically all TA 
was provided by USAID. In Moldova 
advice and support provided by EU and 
US experts focused more or less exclu-
sively on the WTO Department at the 
Ministry of Economics and Reform. And 
in the case of Croatia German profes-
sionals provided input, mainly to the 
Ministry for Economics.  
However, in retrospect none of the 
missions interviewed considered the 
support received to have been sufficient 
to ensure a “healthier” negotiation result. 
Acceding member countries should 
therefore ensure that TRTA needs are 
identified at an early stage of member-
ship preparations and that the later allo-
cation of outside support corresponds to 
the needs and priorities of the govern-
ment/relevant ministries. The coordina-
tion unit should become the central 
“drop-in” center for facilitating trade-
related technical assistance matchmaking 
and helping to reduce the risk of over-
lapping support measures.  
In contrast to the other countries men-
tioned above, Vietnam’s preparation for 
WTO membership has attracted consid-
erable interest by the international donor 
community. In particular Switzerland, 
Japan, and Finland contributed consid-
erably to Vietnam's early preparations 
for accession (1997-2000) by providing 
trade policy advice to the MoT or by 
implementing capacity-building meas-
ures for makers of trade policy. The 
impact of these initial activities has, 
however, remained limited because of 
the grave reservations of the Communist 
Party concerning WTO membership.36 
Since the government tried to centralize 
all trade expertise in the MoT, the needs 
of other central authorities for trade-
related capacity building have been 
widely ignored. The current lack of 
relevant expertise in other ministries is 
now hindering timely, efficient, and 
deliberate preparations for bilateral 
market access negotiations as well as 
binding commitments on when and how 
conformity of national legislation with 
WTO provisions will be achieved. 
China’s accession to the WTO as well as 
the pioneering bilateral trade agreement 
(BTA) with the U.S. – ratified in De-
cember 2001 after more than five years 
of cumbersome negotiations - has 
somewhat stirred up the government’s 
approach towards TRTA. Meanwhile, a 
lot of effort is being put into addressing 
the trade-related capacity needs of other 
                                                 
36 For an overall assessment of Vietnam’s trade 
policy formulation capacity, see Pannatier, 
Serge, op. cit.   
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ministries in a more coordinated, de-
mand-driven manner.  
3. Empirical Results: Basic 
Institutional Options for 
Inter-ministerial 
Coordination  
The case studies presented in the previ-
ous chapter have clearly demonstrated 
that the question of how to organize 
national trade-related coordination 
capacities must take place against the 
backdrop of given constitutional parame-
ters and established administrative tradi-
tions. Frictional losses, inappropriate 
information filtering, unacceptable 
processing times, clogged coordination 
capacities, poor internal arbitration, an 
inadequate sense of responsibility, ritual-
istic behavior, or insufficient institu-
tional flexibility – to name some but not 
all the problems emerging - can only be 
reduced or overcome if stakeholders 
understand and accept the functions of 
the different “nodal points” within the 
national trade-related coordination net-
work.  
Ensuring effective trade-related coordi-
nation is an issue that extends beyond 
the phase of accession. It is even more 
important to reaping the full benefits of 
WTO membership. The key difference 
between active, dynamic WTO members 
and those with a “back seat” approach is 
usually directly linked with the structure 
and the performance of member national 
trade coordination mechanisms and the 
performance of their Permanent Mis-
sions to Geneva. 
Empirical evidence has shown that inter-
ministerial coordination must take into 
account the views and opinions of other, 
non-governmental stakeholders as well 
in order to avoid justified complaints 
when the commitments entered into are 
subsequently implemented. More sophis-
ticated coordination mechanisms there-
fore must involve the following protago-
nists: 
• Government: In democratic societies 
the focal point of political decision-
making is the Prime Minister, the 
Chancellor, or the President.37  
• Line Ministries are the immediate 
support institutions of the govern-
ment, helping to prepare and imple-
ment political decisions within their 
sphere of influence.  
• The Permanent Mission to Geneva 
maintains contact with the WTO Se-
cretariat, compiles and distributes in-
formation, receives instructions, and 
organizes official visits of govern-
ment or parliamentary representa-
tives to the global trade body. The 
mission helps to “translate” the dy-
namics of daily WTO business and 
is, first and foremost, the information 
broker or “interface” between the in-
ternational trade authorities in Ge-
neva and domestic stakeholders in 
the capital.38 
• Parliament: the legislative body 
controls the government and has to 
approve internationally negotiated 
(trade) commitments. Specialized 
                                                 
37 Some transition economies (such as Vietnam) 
or countries with a People’s Democracy 
background still rely on the Central Commit-
tee’s Secretary General as a “sideline” au-
thority. 
38 In particular LDC’s have difficulties in 
establishing or maintaining a costly perma-
nent representation endowed with sufficient 
human resources, and this reduces their abil-
ity to shape the multilateral trade regime. 
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committees and subcommittees de-
liberate on trade issues and should 
therefore be informed (or involved) 
at an early stage of negotiation in or-
der to later facilitate parliamentary 
ratification.  
• The Business Community advances 
its economic interests through lobby 
activities of specialized associations 
as well as through the mass media 
and the political parties (financing of 
election campaigns). Its impact on 
the negotiation process depends upon 
the resources available, membership, 
and political ties. 
• Research Capacity assesses the 
impact of different negotiation sce-
narios or options, thus providing in-
put for the shaping of public opinion. 
• Civil Society: national pressure 
groups are increasingly important 
protagonists whose influence and 
mobilization capacity should not be 
underestimated. Finding a suitable 
way to include them in national 
preparations for international trade 
negotiations creates transparency, 
demonstrates participatory under-
standing and could help to legitimize 
outcomes.39  
• Coordination Point: balances par-
ticular interests of various stake-
holders, either prior to the political 
decision-making phase or during the 
phase of implementation. Usually 
this task is awarded to a line ministry 
with direct trade authority or to an 
inter-ministerial entity close to the 
center of government. Sufficient 
communication and arbitration ca-
pacities are essential to safeguard 
this function.  
Considering the complex nature of the 
daily work of the numerous WTO com-
mittees and subcommittees, and taking 
into account the different constitutional 
frameworks and administrative traditions 
involved, at least four basic approaches 
to organizing national trade-related 
coordination can be identified: (1) a 
centralistic approach, (2) a special coor-
dination unit or secretariat, (3) line 
ministry as coordination focus, and (4) a 
decentralized model with arbitration. 
The principal – although somewhat 
exemplary – options are discussed in 
more detail below. 
3.1. Centralistic approach  
The constitutional set-up of (acceding) 
WTO member countries varies as far as 
degree of ministerial autonomy or, con-
versely, the emphasis on collective 
government and/or the Prime Minister’s 
constitutional prerogative to intervene in 
the conduct of ministerial policy is 
concerned. The practice of closely coor-
dinating trade matters reflects these 
different national weightings in the 
interplay of forces between Prime Minis-
ter / Cabinet / Ministers.  
Some WTO member countries with a 
planned economy background follow a 
tradition with a strong central direction 
of policy-making. While the government 
holds the political responsibility in trade 
issues, a secretariat or department within 
the government’s office  (institutionally 
as close as possible to the Prime Minis-
ter/ President / Chancellor), acts as a 
                                                 
39 The actual impact of civil society groups 
depends, first and foremost, on the political 
system, on their trade-related expertise, on 
financial resources, and on ties with the me-
dia and/or prominent political stakeholders. 
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3.2. Special unit as coordina-
tion focus 
inter-ministerial coordination unit 
an intra-governmental center for 
tion, transmission, and instruc-
 WTO matters. Research is gov-
t-initiated, and the business 
nity has established close links to 
tral coordination point. 
Another way of organizing trade-related 
coordination can be found close to the 
government, i.e., under the Prime Minis-
ter’s/President authority, but not located 
in their office: a permanent secretariat or 
unit focusing exclusively on trade issues.  s of strategic direction - the 
to establish linkages between 
fields (packaging and "repackag-
ring the negotiation process) and 
herent intervention of national 
ntatives in the WTO's various 
s and (sub-) commissions - this 
 could be rated as one of the 
t" on the WTO scene. An exam-
this type of coordination mecha-
 – with some reservations – the 
 Republic.  
All inter-ministerial meetings concerning 
national positions in the WTO are con-
vened by this unit for arbitration and 
consensus, and all information from the 
Permanent Mission in Geneva, as well as 
instructions addressed to it, must pass 
through the unit. Inter-ministerial con-
troversies which cannot be solved at this 
unit’s level may be referred to the center 
of the government. Countries with sub-
stantial elements of this coordination 
THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF WTO ACCESSION 31
type in
garia.40
The IM
“Cente
have a
nently 
as pub
make i
involve
tity,” th
the line
by esta
in whi
from th
basis.  
3.3. 
Among
tries, 
trade-r
           
40 In th
was/
spec
 Figure 2: Coordination by specialized unit 
 Parliament   Center of Government   
Permanent    
Mission  
Line    
Ministry 1  
Line  
Ministry 2  
Line   
Ministry 4  
Line  
Ministry 3  
Business Community
IMC 
UnitMoFA 
Research 
 
clude Vietnam, Croatia and Bul-
 
C Unit might be made into the 
r of WTO Excellence,” and thus 
 sufficient number of (perma-
employed) professionals as well 
lic servants at its disposal. To 
t work and to avoid the difficulties 
d in creating a “trade super en-
e unit must forge close links with 
 ministries. This could be handled 
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ch technical experts are drawn 
e line ministries on a secondment 
Line ministry as coordina-
tion focus  
 established WTO member coun-
the third option for organizing 
elated coordination is the most 
popular one: the focus for coordination 
is located in one prominent line ministry 
(usually in the Ministry of 
Trade/Commerce/Economics, or in the 
Foreign Office). Depending on the over-
all size of the ministry as well as some 
other administrative and political vari-
ables, the coordination entity is headed 
by a Director General, up to the level of 
a Permanent Secretary/State Secre-
tary/Vice Minister. Lithuania, Croatia, 
Moldova, Bulgaria, India and Vietnam 
have used core elements of this coordi-
nation approach. 
The main functions of such entities are: 
1) to support the Minister in exercising 
political responsibility in the field of 
overall integration policies, 2) to act as 
an information and document distribu-
tion center, 3) to convene and arbitrate 
inter-ministerial meetings, 4) to prepare 
cabinet meetings, and 5) to finalize and 
transmit instructions to the country’s 
permanent representation in Geneva. 
Contacts between the unit and other 
                                      
ese economies the coordination function 
is split between a line ministry and a 
ial coordination unit.  
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Figure 3: Coordination by line ministry 
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important line ministries are usually very 
close, practically daily.  
This approach leaves a fair amount of 
decision-making and coordination to line 
ministries, while at the other end ensur-
ing cross-sector conformity of trade 
policy in national negotiation planning.  
3.4. Decentralized model with 
inter-ministerial arbitra-
tion 
A considerable number of WTO member 
countries can be characterized as having 
a high degree of ministerial autonomy 
within the general policy guidelines set 
out by the center of government and/or 
the cabinet.  Policies are, in such cases, 
primarily generated by the lead ministry 
subsequent to intensive arbitration with 
other ministries concerned, and then 
presented to the higher authorities for 
final approval. Germany is, for instance, 
a good example for this kind of coordi-
nation. 
In the WTO context, primary develop-
ment of policy stances is highly section-
alized, with much civil service expertise 
and continuity in the ministries. Relevant 
ministries may have a WTO/Trade Desk 
or Focal Point for internal coordination 
and handling incoming information from 
the Permanent Mission. Inter-ministerial 
arbitration is convened by the lead 
ministry in subsequent stages up through 
the civil service hierarchy, if need be, 
leading to meetings between ministers. 
Instructions for the representation in 
Geneva are formalized during regular 
inter-ministerial civil servants’ meetings 
at the Ministry of Commerce/Trade or 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For 
practical reasons and in order to ensure 
internal coherence, the lead ministry also 
accommodates the central transmission 
post for Geneva.  
4. Conclusions 
What lessons can be learned from the 
case studies on India, Moldova, Lithua-
nia, Croatia, Bulgaria, the Kyrgyz Re-
public, Vietnam, and Germany, aside 
from distilling some schematic coordina-
tion approaches from them? What coun-
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t? Or does fragmentary information 
nts the formulation of any more 
al maxims aiming to improve the 
rmance of national coordination 
anisms? 
Thus the following section gives a broad 
overview of institutional parameters 
concerned with the allocation of power 
and duties (or of property rights). Sec-
ond, the section draws some general 
conclusions on each of the five func-
tional variables identified. The chapter 
concludes with a synoptic chart compil-
ing some more in-depth information on 
what is perceived as essential for an 
„effective“ WTO accession (and mem-
bership).   e questions are difficult to answer in 
isfactory way since the interviews 
ucted in Geneva were limited in 
and depth. Any comparative analy-
f national coordination mechanisms 
us fraught with imponderabilities. 
ned to come up in short term with 
 empirical information and guide-
for improving Vietnam’s inter-
terial coordination mechanism, the 
nt study is only an analytical ap-
mation aimed at shedding more 
on how the “effectiveness” of WTO 
bership can better be “assessed.” 
4.1. Institutional variables 
The formal picture of national trade-
related coordination in many developing 
and transition economies mirrors con-
ventional thinking about how policy 
processes work. Policy preparation is 
presumed to work according to a top-
down approach in which the Prime 
Minister / President makes decisions 
which are elaborated in more detail by 
officials from the line ministries. Admin-
istrative action is programmed in line 
with political priorities. This model puts 
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the main emphasis on defining struc-
tures, especially top-level structures, 
while assuming that they have adequate 
institutional capacities and the appropri-
ate processes to manage policy prepara-
tion.  
Often these assumptions are not realistic. 
Under the top-down model, the crucial 
issue is designation of a particular gov-
ernment unit as “the coordinator”. As 
noted in the study, there are several 
candidates for this function. In dealing 
with WTO affairs, it is natural to see the 
Economic or Trade Ministry as key 
coordinator for advancing integration-
related issues. Even so, this can never be 
the exclusive responsibility of any one 
ministry or unit. At the political level, 
prime minister, president, and cabinet 
also claim a role, and the ministries of 
economics, finance, and foreign affairs 
are invariably involved. If each presses 
its claims to dominance, disagreements 
about where responsibility for coordina-
tion should be located may degenerate 
into a bureaucratic power struggle!41 
The conventional top-down approach 
describes the manner in which policies 
are legitimized and authorized, rather 
than the way in which they are effec-
tively managed in practice. In reality, no 
single ministry or central institution can 
exercise a monopoly. Coordination is a 
collective process to which the expertise 
of the functional ministries as well as the 
overview of central institutions contrib-
utes. Coordination refers to the manner 
in which the efforts of different parts of 
                                                 
41 See the conflict in Moldova or Lithuania’s 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry for Agriculture. 
the system mesh with each other rather 
than how one part of the system attempts 
to control the rest. Effective coordination 
therefore requires a clear recognition of 
the plurality of organizations (ministries 
and other bodies) that must be involved 
in the preparation of WTO membership. 
It is an adaptive, networking process 
rather than a hierarchical control proc-
ess.  
Another problem with the central control 
model of coordination is that it accords 
too little attention to the contributions of 
horizontal coordination between minis-
tries. The Vietnamese example has 
demonstrated the built-in central suspi-
cion of the willingness and the ability of 
functional ministries to coordinate with 
each other. But in practice the effective-
ness of a coordination system depends 
crucially on “coordination without a 
coordinator.” That is, direct, often in-
formal, horizontal coordination without a 
central coordinator to supervise ongoing 
events.  
If coordination at the technical level is 
weak, seldom practiced, or perceived as 
a loss of institutional autonomy, too 
much of the workload of preparation and 
arbitration will fall to top-level coordi-
nating institutions. Consequently, they 
will be overloaded and clogged with a 
large numbers of technical problems 
which require detailed decisions. Thus 
the structural approach runs the risk of 
over-centralization and slow responses. 
This is an important weakness because 
WTO accession and membership often 
requires quick responses.  
In a well-managed system of govern-
ment, there is a division of labor in 
coordination as well as in operational 
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responsibilities. In this perspective it is 
more important to consider coordination 
capacities and processes rather than the 
more conventional emphasis on struc-
tures. Since WTO membership stands 
mainly for identifying and formulating 
domestic interests inside as well as 
outside the national government, minis-
tries and other interest groups must 
overcome exaggerated institutional 
egoism and develop sufficient capacities 
for aligning divergent positions in order 
to achieve a negotiation result that serves 
national trade interests to the highest 
degree possible.  
There is enough evidence to conclude 
that the performance of trade-related 
governance capacities is the main deter-
minant of competent WTO membership. 
Economies whose national stakeholders 
make constant effort to optimize their 
pattern of internal communication and 
cooperation are rewarded by an increas-
ing ability to place their views and posi-
tion on the global trade agenda. It is this 
very specific, difficult-to-obtain “com-
parative advantage” which makes some 
economies more successful than the 
others in leaving their mark upon the 
multilateral trading system. 
4.2. Functional variables 
But how should the “performance” of a 
given coordination system be evaluated? 
Is it possible to compare different na-
tional approaches to inter-ministerial 
coordination or “rank” them according to 
their “effectiveness”?  
The introduction to Chapter 2 has 
stressed the somewhat problematic 
connotation of the term “efficiency” in 
the context of the New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). Since constitutional 
frameworks and administrative traditions 
differ, there is no “ideal” design or even 
"blueprint” for the organization of trade-
related coordination capacities. Each 
country needs its own tailor-made "mix" 
of structures and procedures, of central 
control vs. decentralized decision-
making. The solution perceived as the 
“best possible” or the “most efficient” 
may become backward and inappropriate 
as modernization and economic devel-
opment progress. Since countries in 
transition are characterized by a very 
dynamic legal framework there may be a 
greater need for constant institutional 
upgrading than in mature market econo-
mies. Thus any improvement of the 
national coordination mechanism may be 
perceived as “suitable” only for a limited 
period of time. 
Because there is no common, incontest-
able criteria for the overall “efficiency” 
of institutions, an evaluation of institu-
tional performance must focus on some 
selected parameters which play a cer-
tain, but distinctive role in the satisfac-
tory functioning of trade-related coordi-
nation mechanisms. Important contribu-
tions are made by the five functional 
variables identified: (1) information 
dissemination, (2) packaging for negotia-
tions, (3) arbitration and conciliation, (4) 
cross-sector conformity, and – at least 
for developing countries or economies in 
transition – the (5) allocation of Techni-
cal Assistance.  
The internal dissemination of informa-
tion has to be organized, first and fore-
most, with the intention of meeting the 
information needs of prominent national 
stakeholders. Here, efficient provision of 
 
UWE SCHMIDT 36
information means that the costs for the 
acquisition, verification, processing, and 
distribution of information as well as the 
follow-up costs of incomplete informa-
tion (causing avoidable inquiries) are 
kept at a minimum. The case of India has 
shown how important it is to maintain a 
continuous and comprehensive presence 
at official and informal WTO meetings 
for a sound reporting to the capital. The 
daily business at the WTO is so dynamic 
and complex that the major information 
“interface,” a country’s Permanent 
Mission to Geneva, must be endowed 
with sufficient, well-qualified, and moti-
vated professionals keep track of rele-
vant trade issues.  
Infrastructure matters too. Since relevant 
documents and proposals are circulated 
among WTO members in electronic 
format, a country’s mission should set up 
and maintain its own, tailor-made infor-
mation management system, which 
complements WTO’s on-line document 
database. Additional background infor-
mation gathered in the “vicinity” of the 
global trade body must be processed and 
forwarded to the capital as well. The 
mission’s reports have to be addressed to 
all affected ministries/departments in the 
government apparatus. A well-defined 
division of labor and clear responsibili-
ties at home help to process and utilize 
such information within the framework 
of identified national trade interests.  
Outside the government apparatus, 
important domestic stakeholders also 
have to be kept informed. Establishing a 
mechanism for regular provision with 
WTO-related information and regularly 
monitoring the opinions of business 
associations, parliamentary committees, 
academia, and civil society groups cre-
ates transparency and common aware-
ness on approaches to trade issues. 
Advanced means of communication 
(World Wide Web) and sophisticated, 
publicly accessible databases (e. g. 
WTO’s online document search facility) 
offer additional chances for the cross-
border and cross-institutional flow of 
information. WTO Reference Centers, 
where interested representatives of 
business, academic and civil society 
communities can obtain trade-related 
information and data in electronic form 
as well as in print, serve as an important 
additional information link to the global 
trade body. 
The study has provided enough evidence 
indicating that member countries with a 
targeted system of internal information 
distribution are more successful in par-
ticipating and negotiating WTO-related 
issues than those with a more secluded 
approach. In countries like Vietnam, 
where the internal dissemination of 
information is organized suboptimally 
(i. e. transaction costs for acquiring 
WTO-related information are high), 
stakeholders face severe difficulties in 
gaining a shared and timely understand-
ing of emerging trade issues and agree-
ing on a common negotiation position. 
So sufficient, up-to-date and unbiased 
information is one key element for the 
later formulation of national bargaining 
positions. Even though it becomes more 
difficult to achieve consensus, more 
difficult the more stakeholders are in-
volved in this process, the cases of Croa-
tia, India, and Germany show that the 
result of (trade-related) negotiations here 
enjoys greater legitimacy than a position 
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elaborated by a handful of “omniscient” 
professionals in two or three line minis-
tries directly affected.   
The effectiveness of the packaging 
process for negotiations is likewise 
difficult to evaluate. Here, performance 
depends as much on the communication 
skills of the coordination unit as on 
domestic stakeholders’ perception of the 
fairness and transparency of the packag-
ing process. So performance is deeply 
linked with the coordinator arbitration 
capacity to be discussed. Beside a clear 
objective (i.e. national trade interest) 
around which the activity of the chief 
negotiator is organized, another determi-
nant of efficient packaging is well-
defined property rights. Property rights 
are the rights which transaction partners 
appropriate42 over their own (or as-
signed) goods and services. For trade 
negotiations this means the ability of 
administrative bodies to enter - under a 
clear mandate of the center of govern-
ment - into binding commitments about 
market access, rule-making etc.43 On the 
one hand, property rights define, guide, 
and limit the protagonist’s warranty of 
authority. On the other hand, they gener-
ate certainty by restricting possible 
scopes of action, thus making the behav-
ior of transaction partners more predict-
able and resulting in reduced transaction 
costs.  
The difficulties Vietnam faces in compil-
ing the initial offers demonstrate the 
effects inadequately defined property 
rights. Since accession-related commu-
nications of line ministries can be for-
warded either through the Government 
Office, the Ministry of Trade, or the 
National Committee for International 
Economic Cooperation, transaction costs 
for achieving consensus on possible 
bargaining positions have been substan-
tially higher than in the case of the Kyr-
gyz Republic, where a powerful “Com-
mission on Negotiation with the WTO” 
set the stage for membership negotia-
tions.44 The same is true for Lithuania. 
Here, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
received strong support from the Prime 
Minister and Parliament and ended up – 
according to the interview in Geneva - 
with a relatively smooth packaging 
process without any protracted frictions.  
One element of the packaging process is 
to widen as far as possible the conceiv-
able corridor of a negotiation result later 
perceived as “sound.”45 To this end, a 
sufficient number of bargaining chips - 
possible concessions that are traded in 
exchange for reciprocal concessions by 
counterparts - have to be identified. 
Since efficient packaging means creating 
options for action, domestic stakeholders 
must realize that it may become un-
avoidable during negotiations to give up 
certain bargaining position(s) in order to 
maintain overall, more important na-
tional trade interests.46 Hence, in talking 
                                                 
                                                 
44 Well-defined property rights, however, need 
not necessarily correspond with a “healthy” 
negotiation result.  42 Appropriation is a function of legal rules, 
organizational forms, enforcement, and 
norms of behavior (North 1990, 33). 
45 Thus an early fixation on only one “best” 
solution should be avoided. 
43 Those property rights which are defined in a 
country’s chosen economic system and the 
government’s rules of internal procedure. 
46 Here we must distinguish between “interests” 
and bargaining “positions.” The position 
taken is only a means to an end, is one con-
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about market access commitments more 
attention should be devoted to the elabo-
ration of the initial offer, which is criti-
cal in creating the setting in which nego-
tiations take place. Making a first offer 
at the level of the expected settlement is 
not an effective means of reaching an 
agreement, because such a tactic may 
raise the other party's level of aspiration 
and provide few possibilities to gain 
reciprocal concessions. More successful 
is a rather low offer which expresses an 
attempt to reduce the other party’s level 
of aspiration. Endowed with a sufficient 
number of bargaining chips, the chief 
negotiator possesses enough options to 
achieve a result that falls within the 
corridor of reasonable bargaining out-
comes.  
Although the interviews conducted in 
Geneva did not provide many details 
about the national packaging process, it 
is also obvious from the downloadable 
Schedules on Concessions on Goods and 
on Specific Commitments in Services47 
that the mechanism has not worked well 
in some of the countries looked into. 
Concessions on market access are con-
siderable, transition periods or benefits 
from S&D provisions are few.48 The 
repeated replacement of the chief nego-
tiator in Moldova at the beginning of the 
bargaining for WTO membership would 
seem to suggest that this has impacted on 
                                                                   
                                                
ceivable materialization of the identified na-
tional interest behind. Bargaining positions 
can be relinquished, but sacrificing national 
trade interests must be avoided. 
47 The schedules are reproduced in documents 
mentioned in Chapter 1.2.  
48 These details can be gathered from the 
Reports of the Working Party. 
the packaging process. And in the case 
of the Kyrgyz Republic the preparation 
of the initial offer on services by legal 
experts of USAID seems to be question-
able as well. Even if the capacity to 
develop such an offer is limited, one 
must ask whether it is appropriate to give 
away the opportunity to set the stage 
within the delicate negotiations on mar-
ket access takes place. It would have 
been more advisable to seek the support 
of a private law firm with a good reputa-
tion in WTO issues. Bound to observe 
professional discretion and endowed 
with a sound background in international 
bargaining, such independent advice 
might have not recommended such a 
generous negotiation opener. The fact 
that the business community complained 
about the government’s far-reaching 
concessions49 indicates an inappropri-
ately managed packaging process (or 
rather inappropriate consideration of 
national development priorities!). 
Efficient preparations for WTO mem-
bership entail a mechanism for gradually 
arbitrating disputed issues and conciliat-
ing conflicting parties. Sound perform-
ance here means that disagreements 
within the government apparatus or 
between administration and the business 
community are solved in a structured, 
transparent way. This implies the right of 
each conflicting party to raise the dis-
puted issue to the next higher arbitration 
level. India’s approach to aligning diver-
gent positions is a good example for a 
formal arbitration procedure in which the 
 
49 Even considering the usual laments over less 
competitive enterprises, the domestic com-
plaints are justified, not at least because of 
the packaging procedure.  
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conflicting parties provide their opinion 
in writing to the higher decision-making 
body. The effective functioning of the 
internal arbitration mechanism and the 
resulting internal coherence is probably 
one reason for India’s generally ac-
knowledged performance at the WTO in 
Geneva.  
But efficient arbitration does not neces-
sarily imply a codified procedure for 
defusing conflicting situations. Countries 
like Bulgaria or Germany have not made 
use of such a formal mechanism. Sound 
working relations, well-qualified staff, 
and a profound “team spirit” makes it 
largely possible to avoid clogging higher 
decision levels with inter-ministerial 
arbitration. Mediation between depart-
ments of line ministries is principally 
sought first at the technical level. Be-
cause most disputed issues are due to a 
lack of information, regular horizontal 
communication at the technical level 
substantially reduces the risks (and 
costs!) of misperceptions. Only if no 
success is met with in mediating contra-
dictory positions and no compromise can 
be reached, the controversial issue is 
forwarded to the next arbitration level. 
Interestingly, this informal mode of 
conflict management does not correlate 
with the different administrative tradi-
tions of the two countries. Bulgaria, with 
its background of a centrally planned 
economy, relies as much as Germany’s 
Federal Ministry for Economics and 
Technology on informal approaches to 
conflict solving.  
Vietnam, by contrast, still has to over-
come its internal barriers to communica-
tion. Insufficiently defined property 
rights, red-tapism, and a mentality in 
which personal relations are generally 
more important than a conscientious 
discharge of duties sometimes make it 
difficult to cut the Gordian knot of dis-
puted issues without forwarding the case 
to the very top political decision-making 
level. While still using a central control 
model of coordination, administrative 
action is programmed in line with politi-
cal priorities. The top-down approach, 
however, results in risk aversion at the 
technical level and a limited willingness 
to become engaged in inter-ministerial 
disputes without sufficient support from 
“above.” This means weak institutional 
capacities for aligning divergent posi-
tions.  
A further aspect of efficient arbitration is 
conciliation. Defusing disputed issues is 
only feasible when the decision con-
cerned is made in an objective, transpar-
ent, and understandable manner. During 
the interviews conducted in Geneva, the 
representatives of two recently joined 
member countries (Lithuania and Croa-
tia) reported on internal disputes be-
tween the Chief Negotiator and their 
Ministry of Agriculture. Established 
WTO members had pressed for compre-
hensive market access for agricultural 
products, thus putting a great strain on 
the working relations between the two 
administrative entities. Whether the later 
arbitration by the Prime Minister was 
perceived as fair and transparent cannot 
be assessed on the basis of the informa-
tion available. Here, only an in-depth 
survey in the capitals might reveal the 
additional details needed to make a 
qualitative assessment of the effective-
ness of the conciliation procedure.  
 
UWE SCHMIDT 40
Another delicate issue is successful 
“arbitration” with the business commu-
nity. Because bilateral market access 
negotiations impact heavily on the com-
petitive situation of domestic manufac-
turers and service providers, complaints 
about the level of openness are common 
and unavoidable. But the way in which a 
government elaborates initial (and any 
further) offers seems to be crucial for 
reducing the risk that justified com-
plaints will be raised when the commit-
ments entered into are to be imple-
mented. Past accessions have given clear 
evidence that even if there is little 
chance of real success, it is more appro-
priate to take contentious issues into the 
negotiations with the WTO members 
than to leave them out. Criticism for 
failing to secure a concession or for not 
maintaining an internally agreed tariff 
level is easier to deal with (at least po-
litically!) than criticism for not trying in 
the first place. Ignoring the business 
community in negotiating the conditions 
of accession therefore simply shows that 
those governments have not sufficiently 
realized the importance of a trust-based 
relationship with the business commu-
nity in reaping the benefits from the 
country’s membership in the WTO.  
The safeguarding of cross-sector con-
formity is the fourth key element of an 
effective preparation for WTO member-
ship. Because the accession procedure 
requires applicants to bring their legisla-
tion into line with WTO standards, it is 
essential to develop and maintain a 
deliberate mechanism for revealing 
(actionable!) inconsistencies.  
Whether all these standards are coherent 
with a country’s development, financial, 
and trade needs cannot be discussed 
here.50 It is, however, one main 
characteristic of the progressive 
liberalization of goods and factor 
markets that the options open to 
governments for regulating issues within 
their sphere of authority have been 
narrowed down considerably within the 
past few decades. In the WTO context 
this means that maintaining domestic 
regulations not in compliance with WTO 
commitments entails the risk of complex 
dispute settlement proceedings.51  
Efficient safeguarding of WTO confor-
mity requires – at best - a screening of 
bills and decrees before they are enacted. 
The ex-post revision of legislation is 
cumbersome, costly, and may cause 
confusion during implementation. How-
ever, for those laws and provisions 
which are already in effect, a deliberate 
review mechanism has to be set up.52 In 
principal there are two options: The first 
is a central review by one single institu-
                                                 
50 Past accessions have shown that there is a 
tendency to deny the application for S&D 
treatment, which considers the specific situa-
tion of developing and transition economies. 
Moreover, commitments beyond the re-
quirements of WTO agreements have been 
increasingly requested during accession 
negotiations (e.g. for industrial development 
policy, privatization, enforcement of WTO 
agreements by provincial governments, spe-
cific deadlines for joining the plurilateral 
Agreement on Government Procurement 
etc.). If entered into, these commitments are 
binding and actionable as well.  
51 Thus the term “sovereignty” is being some-
what eroded in that national “property rights” 
are increasingly “transfused” to regional in-
stitutions or to international bodies of rules 
and regulations. 
52 First hints on lacking consistencies can be 
deduced from questions submitted by the 
members of the Working Party during the 
fact-finding phase. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF WTO ACCESSION 41
tion such as the Ministry of Justice, the 
Parliament’s Law Department, or the 
responsible inter-ministerial coordina-
tion unit (line ministry / inter-ministerial 
committee); an approach which has been 
used by virtually all transition economies 
investigated (Lithuania, Moldova, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Croatia and Vietnam). 
The second option is a decentralized 
evaluation in which the individual line 
ministries review the legislation within 
their portfolio. Here, empirical evidence 
is less striking. It seems that only Bul-
garia has followed this approach. How-
ever, both ways of achieving WTO-
compatible rules and regulations have 
their pros and cons. There is no “best 
practice,” since both require a sufficient 
number of legal specialists who have the 
capacity to understand WTO rules as 
well as to put their knowledge into 
practical use.  
One integral part of an efficient confor-
mity check is the development of realis-
tic action plans for redressing existing 
inconsistencies. Elaborated by the coor-
dination unit under intensive consulta-
tion with relevant stakeholders (minis-
tries, parliament’s committees), these 
plans have to serve as internally binding 
schedules. Nevertheless, to demonstrate 
a serious commitment to reform, action 
plans could also be forwarded to the 
WTO secretariat, which would circulate 
them among the members of the Work-
ing Party.  
However, many countries lack the exper-
tise to understand the intricacy of the 
WTO agreements. Consequently, ensur-
ing the conformity of domestic regula-
tions with international commitments (or 
the setting up of a distinctive time frame) 
is a severe test of governmental capaci-
ties. Some countries bypass the “litmus 
test” by outsourcing review functions to 
an international private law firm. Such 
an approach, however, cannot spare 
national authorities the task of later 
drafting, adopting, and enforcing WTO-
compatible rules. Deeply linked with the 
self-conception of legislative as well as 
of administrative authorities, the chal-
lenges of integration can only be met if 
the national bureaucracy has fully ab-
sorbed the rules and principles of the 
global trade body. An external review - 
or even the drafting of legislation – must 
offer the perspective of a respite (or a 
remedy?) until national legal capacities 
are sufficiently developed.53  
The allocation of technical assistance is 
closely connected with the previously 
discussed issue of comprehensive human 
resource development. Understanding 
the WTO agreements and being able to 
act according to the rules of the multilat-
eral trading system require a long-term 
process of investment in human capital. 
Here, trade-related technical assistance 
(TRTA) can help to acquire the neces-
sary knowledge and to build institutional 
                                                 
53 Ministries and parliamentary committees 
must establish teams of legal experts who 
have received intensive training in WTO 
rules, either at home or abroad. Where na-
tional trade law institutes have been not es-
tablished so far, sending civil servants to vo-
cational training courses at, for instance, the 
Canadian Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 
or the recently inaugurated Advisory Centre 
on WTO Law in Geneva, could help to de-
velop sufficient legal capacity in the long run. 
However, appropriate incentives should be 
provided to preventing qualified legal experts 
from moving to jobs that are not trade-related 
(promotion prospects). Again, effective hu-
man resource management is essential within 
this context. 
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capacities. Efficient allocation of it 
requires a systematic approach to identi-
fying own needs and suitable supply 
sources. A “trial-and-error” approach, 
followed by virtually all transition coun-
tries interviewed, would seem to suggest 
that, first, multilateral and bilateral 
supply sources were not tapped in a very 
targeted way. And, second, the trade-
related technical assistance provided 
appears not always to have been able to 
respond to the actual needs of the differ-
ent trade constituents, because national 
authorities had a rather limited apprecia-
tion of their requirements.  
But how is the objective of a useful and 
efficient allocation of trade-related 
support measures translated into action? 
In order to serve identified national trade 
interests to the greatest degree possible, 
several steps have to be taken: 
• To create transparency of actual 
needs and to reduce the risk of 
overlapping HRD support measures, 
it would be essential to establish a 
national focal point with the mandate 
to review, coordinate, and prioritize 
requests for TRTA. The focal point 
would serve as central “drop-in cen-
ter” for both national stakeholders 
and for the donor community. How-
ever, it must be stressed here that the 
purpose of assuming this function is 
not to gain control of the allocation 
of scarce TA resources but to facili-
tate their efficient use. A sound ori-
entation toward “good governance” 
plus a clear definition of roles and 
divisions of responsibilities supports 
the achievement of this task. 
• In order to structure a needs assess-
ment in an appropriate way, a ques-
tionnaire should be circulated among 
those who have a role to play in trade 
policy making and in improving 
trade performance. Here, line minis-
tries, parliamentary committees, 
business representatives (associa-
tions, chambers of commerce), the 
Permanent Mission to Geneva (pro-
vided there is one), and national 
trade-related research and training 
institutes (universities, business col-
leges) should be addressed. Because 
local understanding of future needs 
for support and sources of supply 
may be limited, authorities at 
WTO/UNCTAD should be ap-
proached help in identifying TA re-
quirements that may have been over-
looked as well as in obtaining infor-
mation on who can supply the re-
quested assistance (bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors). 
• The next step is compilation of a 
TRTA plan by identifying and priori-
tizing immediate as well as medium- 
and long-term support needs.54 Here 
it is important to maintain enough 
flexibility to deal with urgent and ad 
hoc requests.  
• The delivery of trade-related support 
measures should be accompanied by 
an in-house auditing and control sys-
tem, which should be maintained by 
the coordinating unit. Internal moni-
toring and evaluation help to secure 
the on-time achievement of expected 
results and the proper utilization of 
available resources and includes a 
systematic and neutral appraisal of 
                                                 
54 Moreover, in order to be effective in this 
area, technical assistance must take a holistic 
approach by linking trade-related issues with 
macroeconomic and structural reforms (busi-
ness law / jurisdiction, administrative reform, 
etc.). 
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the relevance and the performance of 
the TRTA activities implemented.  
• To further improve the design and 
implementation of support measures, 
the relevant information obtained 
from internal auditing should be in-
corporated into future activities.  
Use of such an iterative approach makes 
it more likely that trade-related technical 
assistance will be allocated efficiently 
and in a targets fashion. Operating 
“losses” caused by overlapping or even 
duplicating support measures as well as 
by corruption or repeated preferential 
treatment of certain domestic beneficiar-
ies can be substantially reduced in this 
way. Addressing TRTA needs in a struc-
tured and transparent way will raise 
overall confidence in the work of gov-
ernment and it gives a clear indication of 
the intention to derive benefits from full 
participation in the global trade body as 
well as to become an active, established 
WTO member.  
4.3. Final remarks 
Some striking features of “efficient” 
preparation for WTO accession and 
membership are reproduced in the chart 
below. Future studies will focus more on  
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the contribution and the impact of other 
non-governmental stakeholders, such as 
parliament, the business community, 
academia, or civil society groups, which 
were not the primary objective of this 
initial research. Second, more in-depth 
investigations are necessary to appraise 
whether the five functional parameters 
identified sufficiently depict the objec-
tive of sound WTO performance. It 
would appear that other variables, such 
as the “participation of national interest 
groups,” “HRD support measures for 
government officials,” or a “country’s 
noticeable involvement in WTO’s daily 
business at Geneva” would provide 
additional insights into the institutional 
dimension of effective WTO member-
ship.  
To conclude, assembling sustainable 
national trade policy institutions and 
networks requires action in many areas. 
Efforts aimed at a the better distribution 
of information must go hand in hand 
with the endeavor to design an informal 
arbitration mechanism; trade-related 
capacity-building measures have to be 
used to complement efforts to improve 
the compliance of national legislation 
with  WTO  provisions  etc.  Although  it  
seems somewhat problematic to recom-
mend a single trade policy framework 
that fits the all the conceptions and 
demands of developing and transition 
economies, the study has outlined sev-
eral key features that should be taken 
faithfully into account when addressing 
the issue of upgrading a given trade-
related coordination system.  
Endowed with a clear understanding that 
the approach to trade policy formulation 
and implementation has to be an integral 
part of the national development strat-
egy, domestic stakeholders can contrib-
ute much to meeting the challenge of 
efficient WTO accession and member-
ship. On the other hand, the international 
donor community must support this 
process through more sophisticated 
technical assistance concepts and the 
financial resources needed to implement 
them. Otherwise the increasing complex-
ity of the multilateral trading system will 
run the risk of further widening the gap 
between those WTO members who are 
able to make their voice heard and those 
whose silence undermines the credibility 
of the global trade body. 
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